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International Roundtable for the Semiotics of Law

International Journal for the Semiotics of Law

An Outline of Greimasian Semiotics (by Bernard Jackson)

Within legal semiotics a range of theoretical and methodological stances are to be found, one of the most important points of distinction amongst them being their views on reference. The semiotics of the Greimasian school is based upon a non-referential theory of meaning. It holds that meaning consists in relations within a particular system of signification, and does not depend upon a relationship of reference to the outside world. In this, it contrasts with the tradition of semiotics deriving, in modern times, from the work of C.S. Peirce.

The claims of a legal semiotics inspired by Greimas (not all of which, of course, are unique to this particular tradition) may be summarised in the following propositions:

• Law should not be considered as a set of reified norms, but rather as a communicative phenomenon, that is as messages and means of communication which actually circulate in the legal world (or worlds).


• In explaining this construction of meaning (any meaning, not specifically legal meaning), a distinction is drawn between the “deep level” of signification, the “thematic level” and the “surface level” or “level of manifestation”. At the deep level we encounter “elementary structures of signification”, which are sometimes claimed to be universal, not only as between different types of discourse within a particular society, but also cross-culturally. These structures explain the minimum conditions for a discourse to bear any meaning at all; they are also necessary but insufficient parts of the explanation of what makes the meaning of a discourse “legal”. To complete that explanation, we need to attend to the particular ways in which the deep structures are invested at both the thematic level (the stock of internalised social knowledge, itself organised in narrative terms, or “narrative typifications of action”) and the surface level (“level of manifestation”, the sense data actually presented to us, including both the content of the text (or behaviour) and its manner of expression — whether oral or written). The methodologies used to approach these three levels are differents.


• The deep level of discourse, i.e. the structure of meaning of sequences of sentences, is modeled upon the deep level of semantics, i.e. the structure of meaning of individual words in sentences, and consists in the interplay of two axes: the syntagmatic and the paradigmatic. We see here the influence of the structural tradition in linguistics, particularly Saussure and Hjelmslev.


• The syntagmatic axis is the “semio-narrative” level, developed from the formal analysis of Russian folk-tales by Vladimir Propp. Every human action, for Greimas, begins with the establishment of a goal, which thereby institutes a semiotic object as “subject”. In realising the action, the subject will be helped or obstructed by other actions of other social actors. The desired action itself will be achieved, or not achieved. But it is a characteristic of human action that the sequence does not finish there. Man, as a thinking being, reflects upon past actions. As a consequence, the syntagmatic axis of Greimas concludes with the concept of recognition (or “sanction”). Human action (whether real or fictional) thus appears meaningful in terms of a basic (“narrative”) sequence, which consists in the setting of goals (“contract”), “performance” (or non-performance) of those goals, and “recognition” of that performance (or non-performance). These goals may be of any kind. It is particularly important in the present context to stress that they may include communicative goals: the advocate is institutionally set a goal of persuasion — but others equally set themselves such goals.


• The paradigmatic axis (following Saussurean and Lévi-Straussian foundations) is more abstract. At every point on the syntagmatic axis, there are choices to be made. But such choices are limited to things which may be substitutable, one for the other. At each point in the narrative syntagm, there thus exist (conventionally-defined) semiotic constraints, as to what elements are substitutable for each other without altering the meaning of other elements in the syntagm. Greimasian semiotics represents these elements through a formal devise, the “carré sémiotique”, which has features both in common with and diverging from the square of classical logic. Like deontic logic, it provides an account of the relations between such concepts as duty, permission, prohibition; but it can also explain the sense relations contained in groups of concepts not explicable in terms of classical logic, such as the choice between marriage and cohabitation.


• Both the narrative syntagm and narrative typifications of action are applicable not only to the content of a narrative (semantics), but also to the act of enunciation (or communication) of that narrative (pragmatics). This generates the concept of the “narrativisation of pragmatics”. The enunciation of messages is as much an action as anything else which human beings do. It is generally assumed to be meaningful action. We therefore have to ask whence derives its meaning. A Greimassian would suggest that there are necessary conditions for the attribution of such meaning, including the semio-narrative syntagm (“deep level”). But within any particular society or social group, what counts as a successful enunciation, and what type of enunciative meaning is attributed to it (assertion, threat, play, irony, etc.) are matters of internalised social knowledge (“thematic level”), as indeed are the signs (at the “level of manifestation”) of successful performance.


• There is no “deep structure” in the Chomskyan sense peculiar to legal discourse. But by using the methodological tools provided by the general theory of signification of the Greimasian school, we may identify the specifically legal manifestations of these general structures. Legal discourse may manifest (by attributing to its actors) a particular set of actantial roles. And at the linguistic level of manifestation, it may prove distinctive in any of its syntactic, semantic and pragmatic dimensions. Law has its own groups of users, amongst whom signification is conveyed in particular ways.


• There is a sociological dimension to the description of the semiotic specificity of law, particularly as represented in modern pragmatics. The linguistic features of different legal discourses cannot be studied in isolation from the use made of such discourses. When we study such uses, we have to identify the users of each form of discourse, and their particular purposes (which are often institutionally defined). Such groups are sometimes called “groupes sémiotiques” — networks of people who communicate messages to each other, using codes and other semiotic devices particular to those groups. It is this pragmatic dimension of semiotic analysis which provides both part of the description of, and an explanation of the significance of, the existence of a set of different legal discourses within what we call “the law”.


• The semiotician does not take at face value the self-description of a phenomenon as “legal”. Such a self-description is no more than part of the message which the phenomenon conveys. What the semiotician perceives as presented to him or her is simply discourse (though not necessarily written or even linguistic discourse). It follows that s/he is not bound to accept that different discourses form a single set simply because each describes itself as “legal”. And in fact, the semiotician will analyse individually all those different types of discourse which are conventionally regarded as forming part of the legal system: legislation, jurisprudence, doctrine, as well as unofficial legal discourses such as lawyer-client conversations and indeed legal philosophy itself. Since Greimasian semiotics rejects the idea of extra-linguistic reference, it cannot conclude that all such discourses refer to the same thing, “the law”. Rather, each one makes internal claims (explicit or implicit) to refer to other “legal” discourses, but these claims are simply part of the message that each such discourse conveys. The extent to which this multiplicity of self-describing legal discourses do in fact form a single set will depend upon the outcome of a comparative analysis of their respective semiotic characteristics — and indeed of their comparison with other, non-legal discourses. We may, for example, find that lawyer-client discourse has more in common with that between doctor and patient than with other types of “legal” discourse. We may find that the means used to convey the message that a particular discourse is “legal” is entirely different when the discourse is between layman and layman, lawyer and lawyer, client and lawyer, lawyer and judge, etc.

See further B.S. Jackson, Making Sense in Law (Liverpool: Deborah Charles Publications, 1995), ch.5, and for a more detailed and technical account, Semiotics and Legal Theory, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1985; paperback ed. 1987, reprinted Liverpool: Deborah Charles Publications, 1997.

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